The perceived world is the always-presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value, and all existence. This thesis does not destroy either rationality or [value]. It only tries to bring them down to earth.
Introduction
In evaluating John McDowell's claim that human beings are essentially rational animals, I propose to consider his conceptualism with respect to action. I will limit my discussion to action because, although a whole debate has grown up around McDowell's claim that perception is conceptual, McDowell has only recently turned to the subject of action, and so far little has been written on the subject.
I feel especially drawn to McDowell's work because he has developed a view that sounds like Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's. Like Merleau-Ponty he tells us: HUMAN AFFAIRS 17, 101-109, 2007 DOI: 10.2478 An experiencing and acting subject is ... herself embodied, substantially present in the world that she experiences and acts on (McDowell 1994, 111) .
And he sounds like Heidegger when he speaks of "our unproblematic openness to the world" (ibid., 155) and of how "we find ourselves always already engaged with the world" (ibid., 134). Like these existential phenomenologists, McDowell makes the bold claim that "this is a framework for reflection that really stands a chance of making traditional philosophy obsolete" (ibid., 111).
In carrying out his project, however, McDowell has restricted himself to using only the resources of what he calls the tradition. Specifically, drawing on Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel he defends the view that what differentiates human beings from mere animals is that human beings are essentially rational animals, that is, they are capable of stepping back from their involvement and asking for and giving reasons, and moreover, human perception and action in general should be understood in the light of this rational nature.
In this essay, I will seek to show that McDowell should go further in abandoning the tradition-that to take account of everyday skilled action he needs to incorporate the insights of existential phenomenology, a movement with a new understanding of openness, of the world, and of the importance and uniqueness of our preconceptual involvement in it.
Action
As in the case of perception, which according to McDowell is conceptual "all the way out" (ibid., 67), McDowell could be said to hold that human action is conceptual "all the way down." In Mind and World he asks the question: How can our bodily movements be meaningful actions? And he answers:
Kant says, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind". Similarly ... movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not expressions of agency. ... The parallel is this: intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our active nature in which conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated (ibid., 89, 90. My italics).
According to McDowell, this means that we can always ask and answer the why question. Indeed, for McDowell the capacity to step back from our involvement and examine the reasons on the basis of which we acted is the essential feature of human being that distinguishes us from mere animals.
Of course, we don't normally reflect while we act. McDowell notes that "what matters is the capacity to step back. If someone actually steps back that shows she had the capacity to do so" (McDowell 2006 (McDowell , 1066 . But, to begin with, we need to ask not whether we have the capacity to step back even when we are not exercising it, but what role actually exercising this capacity to step back plays in our activity.
When we are absorbed in everyday skillful coping we may well have the capacity to step back and reflect, but we may not be able to exercise that capacity without disrupting our coping. This is not to deny that in learning a new skill or trying to improve our current skill we can monitor our activity while still performing. But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it leads to performance which is at best competent, and only after more practice, and abandoning monitoring our activity, can we regain our expertise.
For an extreme example of the inverse relation of reflection and skilled action, consider the case of Chuck Knoblauch, a former second baseman for the New York Yankees. Knoblauch was so good he was voted best infielder, but one day, rather than simply throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and started reflecting on how he was throwing the ball-the mechanics of it, as he put it. (As Kant would put it, he treated his skill as set of representations and attached an "I think" to each.) After that, he couldn't recover his former unreflective absorption and from then on he threw the ball erratically-once into the face of a spectator. They tried moving him to the outfield, but that didn't help. He never could stop exercising his spontaneity, his capacity to reflect, so as to be able to exercise his receptivity, his capacity to let himself be involved, and eventually he had to be dropped from the team.
Knoblauch presumably had the skill to throw to first base, and was in a situation that would normally have led him to respond directly to the demands of the situation, but he was not able to let himself be involved, and so he wasn't able to exercise his skill. It turns out that, McDowell's emphasis on the capacity to reflect not withstanding, being able to act skillfully requires temporarily relinquishing the ability to reflect.
But does McDowell need to answer this objection? Can't he just say, "So what if actually stepping back, engaging in critical reflection, and then acting for a reason leads to actions that are at best competent."? Nonetheless, we rational animals are defined by our capacity to step back and reflect on our reasons, even if we cannot exercise this ability while absorbed in acting.
A movement is permeated by rationality, according to McDowell, if one can in retrospect, without needing to have reflected while acting, nonetheless articulate the reason for one's action. He offers an ingenious example of an unreflective action that is nonetheless rational:
Consider someone following a marked trail, who at a crossing of paths goes to the right in response to a signpost pointing that way. It would be absurd to say that for going to the right to be a rational response to the signpost, it must issue from the subject's making an explicit determination that the way the signpost points gives her a reason for going to the right. What matters is just that she acts as she does because (this is a reason-introducing "because") the signpost points to the right. What shows that she goes to the right in rational response to the way the signpost points might be just that she can afterwards answer the question why she went to the right-a request for her reason for doing that-by saying "There was a signpost pointing to the right". She need not have adverted to that reason and decided on that basis to go to the right (ibid., 1066-7).
But just how can the runner go right for a reason without reflecting? Just what must she be able to do if not actually reflect on her action for her activity to count as being permeated with conceptuality? McDowell answers:
[T]he conceptual capacity that [the woman's] possession of the ability [to give her reason] entitles us to attribute to her, with the concept of things that point to the right as its content is operative also in the unreflective response we are considering: a response, not involving reasoning, to a signpost's pointing to the right as a reason for going to the right. Conceptual capacities in the relevant sense are at work not just in reasoning but, in general, in responding to reasons as such, whether or not it takes the form of explicitly drawing conclusions from reasons in forming beliefs or in acting… (ibid., 1067-8). Acting for a reason, which one is responding to as such, does not require that one reflects about whether some consideration is a sufficient rational warrant for something it seems to recommend. It is enough that one could (ibid., 1066).
It is important to note that McDowell wisely avoids the intellectualist/cognitivist mistake of introducing conscious or unconscious mental operations to explain coping abilities. (He does not succumb to this version of the myth of the mental as I once accused him of doing.) We agree that, the reasons that may have been involved in learning a new skill, or in coaching, needn't play any role in the final skilled performance. When one has become an expert one is directly open to the situation and directly does what the situation demands.
1 After experience with many right-pointing signposts, the woman develops a skill and, like an expert, responds immediately and directly to the situationthe signpost would then be operative without any mental operations being required.
McDowell thus holds the view that all that is required for a movement of a limb to be an action is for conceptual capacities to be "inextricably implicated."
But what does that mean? To understand and criticize McDowell's conceptualism, one must ask: what actually happens in an instance of expert coping that makes it conceptual? The answer can be brought out by returning to the runner's answer to the question why she ran to the right: that "there was a signpost pointing to the right." According to her report, she didn't even have to have noticed the signpost. All that McDowell requires in order for her running to the right to involve conceptual capacities is that there was a signpost pointing to the right and that she responded to it under that description in running to the right.
But does it follow that all it takes for the woman's running to be rational, i.e. conceptual, i.e. an action, is that the signpost cause her action, i.e. that the signpost's pointing to the right is the runner's reason for running right? Unfortunately, the signpost is a misleading example. It is not minimal enough. Because it is a sign, as McDowell notes, it needs to be noticed and interpreted. This builds into the woman's action more than is required in acting and thereby stacks the case for the runner's running to the right being inextricably conceptual.
To see what is at stake, it helps to switch to the purer phenomenon of the chess master making a masterful move. All accounts agree, and so presumably would McDowell, that in normal play, unless he faces a problem that he hasn't dealt with 1 In general such unreflective coping experiences are experiences of "affordances," in which things in the world "solicit" appropriate activity. I use the Gestaltist's term "solicit" to refer to a datum of phenomenology. To say that the world solicits a certain activity is to say that the agent feels immediately drawn to act a certain way. This is different from deciding to perform the activity, since in feeling immediately drawn to do something one experiences no act of will. Rather, one experiences the environment calling for a certain way of acting, and finds one's body responding to the call. There is no experience of an object and so no object to bring under a concept. There is also no "I". Involved in the flow, one's body is just drawn to do what needs to be done. before, a Grandmaster doesn't reason. That's why he or she can play any number of simultaneous games.
2 Clearly, the Grandmaster responds directly to the position on the board. There is no time and no he has no need to reflect and to reason. Jose Capablanca, one of the greatest Grandmaster's of all times, is said to have responded when asked how many moves he looks ahead: "I see only one move ahead but it is always the right one."
The Master need never have seen the exact position he is confronting before and will probably never see it again. So it might seem that, just as the propositional structure, "that there was a signpost-pointing-to-the-right," would have to be "operative" in the runner's running to the right, the Master must respond to the current board position's underlying propositional structure as falling under a type he has responded to successfully before. That would not require recognizing it or even noticing it as a familiar position, but it would require directly responding to the position as a type of position that required a certain type of move, even if the Grandmaster was not aware he had done so. After all, there must have been some abstractable structure of the position that justifies the Grandmaster's responding with a move that has a specific answering structure and not some other one. If not, how could the Grandmaster's move be a rational action?
So it looks like everything turns on whether there was in fact something abstractable, general, and repeatable about the type of position that elicited a type of response. Not something-and now we are back to McDowell's basic move to capacities-the Grandmaster did think but something the Grandmaster could have thought. This requirement fits the signpost case. A signpost pointing to the right is a type and running to the right is a type of response so the action can be conceptual and therefore thinkable even if no one thinks it.
But, as we have noted, the signpost is a special case, and it is conceivable that in the normal case there need be no underlying abstractable propositional structure to which the Master is capable of responding. McDowell doesn't have, nor does he need, an argument that in all skillful action general concepts must be involved. Indeed, McDowell abandons the traditional requirement that concepts must be general. As McDowell has argued in the case of perception, concepts can be situation specific. For example, demonstrative propositions can pick out a specific color. Couldn't a reason for acting also be a demonstrative? Couldn't the master say while pointing: "Because I was in this specific position I made this specific move," where "this" does not pick out a type of position and a type of move but a specific position and response?
But one runs into the same problem here that Sean Kelly pointed out in the case of color. Could a specific board position, by itself, be a reason for an action? As Kelly argued, there is more to the specific color that is denoted by "that shade" than its colorchip color. Likewise, pointing to the specific pieces on the specific squares on the board as that position doesn't capture what it is about that position that draws the Grandmaster to make that move. There is, in both cases, the context. The same layout of pieces, at different stages of the game, with a different player on the offensive, etc. will have to be taken into account when referring to that position. However, as Kelly has pointed out in the case of perception, adding a lot more demonstratives to the effect that this move is in this game with this tempo and this long-rang strategy etc. still would not capture what draws the Grandmaster to make the expert move in question. After all, a neutral observer could know all those demonstrative facts about the position and its context and still have no idea what move to make. What more is needed?
To find out we need to learn more about the way the skill domain is experienced by a master involved in the game. In this connection, we can learn from Vladimir Nabokov. As Nabokov spells out brilliantly in The Defense, a chess master does not see the board as a propositional structure no matter how specific and contextual. When involved in the game, and only while involved, he sees "lines of force". When he is playing blindfolded, Nabokov's Grandmaster saw: [T] his or that imaginary square was occupied by a definite, concentrated force, so that he envisioned the movement of a piece as a discharge, a shock, a stroke of lightning-and the whole chess field quivered with tension, and over this tension he was sovereign, here gathering in and there releasing electric power (Nabokov 1990, 91) .
The Grandmaster also experiences containment, leaks, confrontations, pressures. These attractions and repulsions are not reducible to, or characterizable as, objective facts about a board position that can serve as reasons to be shared and criticized by detached observers. They are experienced only if one is already a master and only as long as one is totally involved in the game.
But perhaps this is still too quick. Even if we allow Nabokov's phenomenology of chess, doesn't McDowell's conceptualist still have a move? Can't he say, for instance, that the Grandmaster's reason for making this move is that he sees "that that leak must be plugged" or "that this confrontation must be engaged?" But even this strategy will not work. What constitutes a given situation may change from moment to moment, even if all the pieces on the board remain in place. The opponent's overall style, for instance, might go from cringingly defensive to imperiously offensive, and these changes might very well occasion changes in the Grandmaster's sense of the attractions and repulsions soliciting him to respond. Merleau-Ponty (1965, 168-9 . My italics) describes a similar sort of continually changing forces in a soccer game:
For the player in action the soccer field is not an 'object'. It is pervaded with lines of force (the 'yard lines'; those which demarcate the 'penalty area') and is articulated into sectors (for example, the 'openings' between the adversaries), which call for a certain mode of action. The field itself is not given to [the player], but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the 'goal' for example, just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body…At this moment consciousness is nothing but the dialectic of milieu and action.
Each maneuver undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field.
The temporal aspect of the game guarantees that no timeless, descriptive, propositional account of the situation could capture the constantly changing attractions and repulsions. Even a demonstrative indication of this moment would fail to capture the flow of the game, since, unlike pointing at that shade, trying to point at "this situation just now" as the reason for the master's response would be just an empty gesture. So why, given that the coper does not experience any features, even situation specific ones, as the reason for his action, should we think that the skill domains experienced by the involved master must be permeated by conceptuality?
Tensions cannot be described but only felt as directly drawing the master to respond. They are what Merleau-Ponty calls motivations, which are neither reasons nor causes. Such motivations are not available as reasons when the master reflects but are only embodied in the action itself. Merleau-Ponty calls acting in response to such motivations, motor intentionality.
Thus, although there must be a sub-personal causal account in the realm of law of how the changes in the master's brain brought about by his past experience causes the master to make a particular bodily movement, such causes can only be experienced as tensions not as causes nor as reasons for acting. There may simply be no reason for making that specific chess move other than that the master felt drawn to make it. The master could, of course, still give as his reason for making the move, "I felt drawn to make it," or, "I just felt like doing it." But such a response would be too situation-specific to count as a reason. As McDowell says in another connection when speaking of reasons, they must be "rationally interlinked in ways reflected by what it makes sense to give as reason for what" (McDowell 1998, 169) .
Most important of all, a response to a motivation is not a fact in the world of propositional structures; it is the coper's motor intentional access to the world of propositional structures. So, as soon as the coper steps back and tries to name what he has just been experiencing even as "that tension", the tension is transformed into an object and it's motivational character is lost. It follows that the phenomenologist can speak about motivations in general but not name specific ones. When Merleau-Ponty tries to describe specific motivations he can speak only in metaphors.
What, then, entitles the conceptualist to say that in the player's making a move conceptual capacities must have been inextricably implicated? All we have right to claim as far as the phenomenon is concerned is that the player responds to dimensions of the situation other than abstractable features or even features that could be picked out demonstratively. That is, when involved, the skilled coper senses and responds to the non-propositional forces of attraction and repulsion structuring the skill domain.
Of course, this phenomenon does not occur only in sports. Absorbed in driving, a driver can sense what observers see as a traffic light changing to yellow, as a clarion call to speed up, or as a gentle reminder to slow down. Or, to take another driving example, it can be a fact in the world that there is a certain distance between two cars, but the New York driver senses an irresistible attraction to swerve into the open space while the Berkeley driver senses an opportunity to invite someone to pull in front of her.
There needn't even be a feeling of tension. Tension only is present if there is some sort of competition among motivations or if something is sensed as deviating from one's anticipations. Then the expert is like a pilot following a radio beacon. When things are going well, the pilot hears nothing, but when he deviates from the assigned path he hears a signal summoning him to return to it. Likewise, if things are not going as expected, the coper feels called to change his course. If everything is going as expected, however, he or she simply goes with the flow.
We sense the world's solicitations and respond to their call all the time. In backing away from the "close talker," in stepping skillfully over an obstacle, in putting an envelope in a mailbox we find our body acting in definite ways without our needing to have decided to do so. In responding to the environment this way one simply gives in to its demands. A central feature of affordances is that they present themselves only when one is not looking for them. If I am trying to figure out the appropriate conversational distance, I immediately lose all sense of what distance the situation calls for. When Knoblauch couldn't stop thinking about the mechanics of throwing to first base, he had to give up baseball.
In general, our everyday activities find us motor intentionally absorbed in an everyday world full of affordances whose solicitations constantly change as we cope. As Heidegger puts it: [W] hat is first of all "given" …is the "for writing," the "for going in and out," … "for sitting." That is, writing, going-in-and-out, sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved with. What we know when we "know our way around" (Heidegger 2007, forthcoming) .
McDowell assumes that since we are essentially rational animals we always have the capacity to reflect and articulate the reason for our action. But the above considerations suggest that the sort of reasons McDowell has in mind have one kind of normative force, but that there is another sort of normative force-the demands of the situation to which we are sensitive when we are involved but which are lost when we step back from our involvement and ask for reasons. When we are absorbed in coping, there are no reasons we can ask about, and there is no guarantee that there are any reasons implicit in our activity that we can reconstruct after the fact. If so, it follows that most of the time as we find our way around in the world we do not act as rational animals, so we cannot understand all perception and action in the light of our rational nature.
3
The basic philosophical point is that, where action is concerned, there are two separate ways of being open to the world-the conceptual and the non-conceptual way. The conceptual way in its pure form describes what happens when one confronts a difficult situation, steps back, figures out what to do, and then responds competently. But, in so far as one is an expert in any domain, and things are going well, one responds directly and transparently to the situation's demands.
McDowell is halfway to being an existential phenomenologist when he dispenses with inner mental operations. But in holding with Kant that to be an action a bodily movement must be conceptual all the way down, he still understands all action, even transparent coping, as a propositional response to a propositional structure. Whereas existential phenomenologists point out that our most basic way of being open to the world around us does not itself have a propositional structure but is our being drawn to relieve tensions in our perceptual field, and therefore that the world we are open to, at its most basic level, does not have a propositional structure either but is revealed as a shifting field of attractions and repulsions that are only available to us to the extent that we are actually involved in coping with them.
We are clearly animals who a capable of both involvement and detachment. There is no reason one has to pick as our defining characteristic one or the other of these two ways of being in the world. The philosophical challenge is to do justice to both worlds and both kinds of openness, and then to figure out how the nonconceptual world opened by absorbed coping and its norms grounds our capacity for stepping back and experiencing a world permeated by conceptuality.
